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DRONES: PROPOSED STANDARDS OF LIABILITY
Kristopher-Kent ‘K-K’ Harris
The law often incorrectly uses the term drone, therefore a more
exact definition is needed. As defined by specialists in the applicable
technological field, the term drone generally means any algorithm that
carries out an action following a command or commands. This includes
commands programmed in advance and real-time commands. A drone
has limited autonomous decision-making abilities and is therefore
always subject to its master, master controller, or operator. Drones
are not capable of truly autonomous artificial intelligence.
Accordingly, this Article will argue that strict liability rather than
negligence is the most appropriate legal standard for assessing the
liability of manufacturers, distributors, designers, and users of drones
for injury caused by a drone.
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INTRODUCTION
The term drone generally means any algorithm that carries out
an action following a command or commands.1 This includes
commands programmed in advance and real-time commands. This
proposal puts forth suggestions about drone liability with the specific
involvement of a master,2 master controller,3 operator, or bystander
through American tort law. Drone liability can be strenuous for
courts to consider, especially if the courts cannot determine the actor
at fault. This Article advocates that courts adopt a strict liability
approach to apportion drone liability under The Restatement (Second)
of Torts and The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability. This
proposal unravels the complexities of drone liability by unmasking
the true master of the drone.
I.

DRONE LIABILITY HIERARCHY

A. Proposed Strict Liability
This Article will argue that the appropriate guiding doctrine for
drone liability is strict or absolute liability. 4 The makers, sellers, or
designers of drone products have rushed to the market, without
conducting the preliminary safety tests that modern American law has
advised for in new technologies. 5 Manufacturing defects are often
responsible for injuries. 6 However, drone sellers are not liable for
1

Memorandum from Reginald C. Govan, Chief Counsel, FAA, to Earl Lawrence, Director,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office (May 4, 2016), 2016 WL 2851144, (addressing
educational use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)); Alex Alben, WASH. OFF. OF PRIVACY &
DATA PROTECTION, WASHINGTON STATE POLICY GUIDELINES FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS (2016), http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/AC738BE5-FDCE-4FD9-A1736C913FDABE24/0/DronePolicyGuidelines.pdf (last visited June 12, 2017).
2
Master, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018).
3
Master Controller, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018).
4
Strict Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
5
See BRUNO SICILIANO, ET. AL., SPRINGER HANDBOOK OF ROBOTICS, 1522 (Bruno Siciliano &
Oussama Khatib eds., 2nd ed. 2016).
6
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1965); See RESTATEMENT
THIRD OF TORTS § 2(a) (AM. L. INST. 1998).
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design or warning instruction faults or for accident or safety costs.7
Thus, under current tort law standards, injured victims cannot be
effectively compensated by the sellers, if said sellers have modified or
rebranded the drone. If the court were to apply a strict liability rule to
this issue, this approach would then serve as an effective test of
responsibility.
The law also requires the application of a test that specifically
considers abnormally dangerous activities. 8 Judges will enforce
liability without fault when explosives cause harm, even if they are
properly handled. 9 When a defendant has been held under a strict
liability standard, neither negligence nor intent must be proven.10 This
principle is ideally suited to drones and strict liability. By definition, a
drone is incapable of acting on its own volition. If a drone performs an
action, it is merely obeying a previous command input. Any resulting
harm is the responsibility of the master controller who, as an operator,
gave the drone that command without first ascertaining that the
command could be safely performed by the drone under his or her
operation. In fact, a recent Seattle court decision has proven that, in
the case of a physical injury inflicted by a drone, the master operator
was properly held to a strict liability standard.11,12
The court would be wrong to attribute blame to the drone, even in
the case of artificial intelligence, since any drone is a mere functionary
of some form of command input and the drone is incapable of acting
on its own volition. Many cases arise where the plaintiff suffers
personal harm at the hands of an employee, but seeks to impose liability
on the employer. In these cases, the employer often contends that the
employee caused the harm in a way that fell outside that employee’s
assigned responsibilities or that the employee otherwise fell short of
the practices which they have been trained to follow. In fact, drones
will, or at least are intended to, follow the will of their operator as well
as their master programmer, service provider, or programmer. Strict
liability provides a definite legal resolution to such matters.
Next, this article explores certain technologies where courts have
applied strict liability, when such technologies have injured an
individual. This article will identify the factors that courts have found
7

See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 6.2 (2d ed. 2008).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377, Instructions No. at 5-9 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 12, 2017);
& Verdict Form, (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 13, 2017) (finding the defendant guilty of reckless
endangerment); SEATTLE, WA. WASH., CRIM. CODE § 12A.06.050 (1973).
12
See discussion infra Section I.C. (for clarification on determining onto whom liability falls.)
8
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to be significant for determining when to apply strict liability.13 Under
tort law, strict liability results from liability for all defective product
distributors.14 First, fault falls on the product distributor when one’s
product design is defective and then the law applies the use of a costbenefit approach test.15 If a product defect causes injury, the selling
business or product’s distributor is held to strict liability for that injury.
Consequently, distributors are held to a strict liability standard for
manufacturing product defects.16 In this manner, the possible result of
bodily harm is made into a concern for the seller, while the injured
individual finds a suitable party to compensate for the defect.17
Furthermore, drone sellers who have rebranded or modified a
drone after manufacturing can and should be strictly liable. This same
attribution of strict liability would still apply in cases where true fault
lies with the manufacturer. If a manufacturer of a delivered drone, for
example, did not include the proper safety materials needed for
protecting the drone’s battery and caused an explosion, then the
manufacturer transgressed upon the basic expectation that the drone
should be safe to use in its surrounding environment. The
manufacturer, who should have reduced the drone’s likelihood of
injuring operators, would therefore be negligent.18 While sellers of the
drones at the wholesaler and retailer levels are not at fault, they are
equally as legally liable as those manufactures of a defective product.
The law holds that manufacturers are strictly liable for the products
which they sell. Therefore, all manufacturing defects present in any
drone (as in any manufactured product) are held to a strict liability
standard by all distributors. This practice is a form of corrective
justice;19 it provides compensation to the injured person, yet enforces a
liability on all distributors. Further, a distributor who claims no
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation of their product is still liable
for any injury inflicted by that misrepresentation, even if the
misrepresentation did not result in negligence or in fault. 20 Similar
liability is enforced upon the manufacturer against defects or due to
misrepresentation.21
13

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
15
Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2000). (“Bombardier” failed to warn the
dangers of the watercraft).
16
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
17
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
18
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
19
Corrective Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
21
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
14
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In like manner, this article will consider instances where strict
liability has been applied to occurrences in which a defendant, through
high-energy activities, has caused physical harm to a plaintiff. An
Indianapolis judge ruled that Sony “notebook/laptop” batteries which
had caused fires or even explosions were unreasonably defective. 22
Hewlett-Packard sought negligence relief in the form of monetary
compensation for its status as the seller of these Sony batteries. So, to
escape Indiana’s products liability statute, Hewlett-Packard carried out
several forensic tests to prove the fault lay with Sony Energy and Sony
Taiwan manufacturing.23 Judges may conclude that liability must be
based on easily-determined fault, but it is not so simple for said judges
to reach this determination if the activity is considered common.24 It is
the right of each state to determine which strict liability tests and rules
its judges enforce. 25 Even if the machine in question might be
dangerous, it should be possible to handle or use the device with an
expectation of reasonable safety, thus minimizing strict liability. 26
Therefore, future drone laws should enforce strict liability on
abnormally dangerous activities, when calculated against deterrents in
future holdings.
Customarily, the court commonly holds that enforcing strict
liability will reduce harm by encouraging an industry to reduce
abnormally dangerous activities, to discover new avenues to achieve
the same desired results, or to encourage these activities to be
conducted in a controlled environment.27 It is not clear whether strict
liability deters risk;28 however, in order to allow drones to be used to
advance our society, we cannot dismiss the fact that risk reduction
would be logically preferable. Naturally, drone activities such as
controlling a drone in a construction site or sending a bot into a highly
22

Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 1:10-cv-01124-JMS-DML, 2011 WL
4550155 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011).
23
Id.
24
DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 32.6 (2d ed.
2016) (citing Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533 (Wis. 1997)).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.6 (citing G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 54 F.3d 379,
386 (7th Cir. 1995) (The popular quote from Posner, C.J.: “…“ . . . the tiger, is that the abnormally
hazardous activity is conceived of as the sale of the thing that makes the activity hazardous, rather
than as the activity itself. It is as if it were fine to keep the tiger in your backyard but if you sell it
to someone else to put in his backyard and the tiger claws him, you are strictly liable for the injury.
We cannot find any precedent, or any basis in common sense, for such a theory of strict liability.
Of course there is also strict liability for the sale of a dangerous or defective product…”)).
28
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.6 (citing Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach
to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 353–54
(1996)).
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hazardous condition can be productive.29 Although there is always a
question of negligence when considering the use of drones for
recreational purposes, some non-recreational activities involving
drones cannot be confined to safety zones. For example, this is true if
such devices are needed in a construction site to reduce human injuries.
The activity may be uncommon or unnatural, but we cannot put too
many deterrents on drone activities, especially if reducing risks is the
ultimate desired outcome.
Distributing risk at an enterprise level undoubtedly necessitates a
different course of action. Society is under the impression that a
corporation itself could not be at fault and that an individual overseeing
the corporation is at fault. However, under the influence of the law,
enterprising business ventures in the drone technology field typically
should display a good-faith effort by allowing their products to undergo
rigorous testing. Currently, society still believes that enterprise backing
of a liability claim equates to that enterprise becoming a good-risk
distributor for its sellers. 30 Most individual inventors cannot be
burdened with protecting themselves from lawsuits, 31 while an
enterprise is more than willing to absorb the costs of cost-benefit
analytics. Similarly, individuals who are harmed by drone technology
might be less likely to file for non-negligent harm.
Following this logic, questions regarding enterprise liability are
not simply restricted to cost-benefit analyses or determinations of the
responsible corporate individual. Each affected community’s concepts
of fairness or justice decide if an individual or a business should bear
the costs of strict liability, even if the business or individual inventor
did not contribute to the cause at hand.32 If an inventor or enterprise
carries out an activity negligently, but in an otherwise perfectly normal
way per his or her community’s expectations, then strict liability may
not be enforced as heavily as it would be in a community which regards
the activities as more high-risk or unique to the situation. 33 New
technologies, like drone technology, should therefore proceed
according to strict liability, rather than the law of negligence.
Presently, the primary issue in apportioning liability among those
who have designed, made, supplied, or operated a drone seems to be
the identification of the particular command inputs which led to the
29

SICILIANO, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1521.
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The
Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1987)).
31
Marcel v. Becnel, 96-1139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So. 2d 1344, writ denied, 97-1080
(La. 6/13/97), 695 So. 2d 984 (1997)).
32
See Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp., 56 Cal. App. 4th 618 (1997).
33
Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
30
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injury in question.34 For example, the law might decide that a flying
drone is not inherently dangerous merely because it flies. Regardless,
the law might also judge, for reasons of justice and public policy, that
liability should be assigned to the person who commanded the drone to
fly so fast that it deprived a small child of his eye. 35 In this same
scenario, we should apportion liability between the drone operator who
gave the offending command and the manufacturer who originally
granted the device the capacity to fly at dangerous speeds when
operated by the end purchaser.
Yet, as with nearly every endeavor, the most complicated factor
remains: the human factor. Judges and juries have not properly
characterized drone activity because they simply cannot comprehend
the technical aspects of which drones are capable and so are reliant
upon technical witnesses to provide even a modicum of elucidation.36
Judges and juries must confront special barriers to the proper
characterization of drone activity when they seek to decipher drone
technology. Drone technological advancement would be hindered if the
courts utilized a uniform approach, as such an approach risks the
likelihood that an equal footing may then develop between a defendant
and a plaintiff in regards to activity characterization. By applying strict
liability, the court signals that the activity is uncommon and that the
defendant’s actions are special.37 Depending on its presentation, the
activity in question might or might not be perceived as abnormally
dangerous by a particular community. 38 Injuries caused by drone
activities can be minimized if judges are able to determine if the risk
stemmed from the defendant or if the plaintiff had any control over
those risks. 39 High-activity risks should instead be considered as
inherent risks,40 regardless of who previously interacted with the drone.
Thus, between the competing principles of tort liability, strict
liability, and negligence liability, strict liability emerges as the best
source of guidance for future case law when dealing with the matter of
liability for drone-caused injuries. However, courts should also
consider developing a more novel and nuanced approach to liability by
34

See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
Mary-Ann Russon, UK toddler Oscar Webb loses eye in UAV accident, INT’L BUS. TIMES,
(Dec. 2, 2015 10:18AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/uk-toddler-oscar-webb-loses-eye-uavaccident-people-are-problem-not-drones-1531390
36
§ 11:95.Content—Explaining technical matters—Importance in product liability and medical
malpractice cases, 2 La. Prac. Pers. Inj. § 11:95
37
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous
Enterprises, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992)).
38
Gallagher v. H.V. Pierhomes, LLC, 182 Md. App. 94 (2008).
39
Id.
40
Inherent Risk, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
35
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taking into account some of the distinguishing factors developed by
previous courts when dealing with injuries caused by agents,
employees, subcontractors, and independent contractors.
B. Proposed Vicarious Liability
When the realms of drone technology and vicarious liability
intersect in a court of law, it is difficult to assign liability between
individuals and results. The complexity of the drone’s role in society,
as both a recreational object and professional asset, only exacerbates
this dilemma, as does the applicability of a master-servant rule41 for
drones. Vicarious liability is a tort for another person who is
accountable for their own legal fault; yet, in the absence of fault, this
individual is not responsible for other parties under the respondeat
superior principle.42 This tort principle addresses actions taken within
the scope of employment by employees who are jointly responsible for
said actions along with their tortfeasor employer (especially private
employers). This principle does not make employees liable for torts of
their employers or of other employees, and the principle does not apply
to employees individually.43
To understand vicarious liability, it is necessary to define the roles
of both the relevant employer and the employee in the scope of
employment. The term master signifies an employer, while either the
terms of agent or servant define an employee. An agent has the freedom
to sign contracts or to sell products for their employer and the employer
can be liable for their agents’ contracts with others.44 However, the
employer is not liable for an agent’s tortious actions.45 Alternatively,
an agent can be known as an electronic agent, 46 the designation of
which can be easily applied to a drone. Employees who perform
physical tasks are called servants.47
Additionally, independent contractors exist as a distinct subset of
employee. 48 Independent contractors differ from servants or agents
because the master is not ordinarily vicariously liable for the
independent contractor’s torts.49 However, the master is liable for the
Master-Servant Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Melin-Schilling v. Imm, 149 Wash. App. 588 (2009).
43
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545 (Ala. 2006)).
44
See Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545 (Ala. 2006).
45
Carman v. Wieland, 406 S.W.3d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)
46
Electronic Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
47
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1
48
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.5 (citing See, e.g., Patterson v. T.L. Wallace Construction,
Inc., 133 So.3d 325 (Miss. 2013)).
49
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.5 (citing Patterson v. T.L. Wallace Construction Constr.,
41
42
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torts of their servants when the servants commit a tort within their
scope of employment. 50 No matter how humanlike or humanoid a
drone may seem, courts should exercise caution before calling a drone
an agent, employee, or servant, because the drone’s master controller
or master is in control of its pre-determined actions.
It may be difficult for courts to understand the proper imputation
of blame in a drone-related incident. In such cases, it is vital to consider
the person of the master controller, who acts as the drone’s service
provider or programmer and who can override the drone operator’s
commands. From the master controller’s perspective as the defendant,
vicarious liability will mean strict liability because the drone should be
without fault.51 However, confusion may remain as to whether fault
lies with the drone, the master controller, the drone operator, the
manufacturer, or with the designer. Should the plaintiff argue a
negligence standard, he or she must first prove that the drone
committed a tort 52 and that it was acting within its scope of
employment.53 In such instances, the fault could fall upon the drone’s
master controller, who might have irresponsibly provided a drone
operator with an unsafe drone 54 or trusted in a reckless drone
operator.55 In such scenarios, vicarious liability does not apply56 and
the master controller is liable for their own negligent entrustment or
their own negligent supervising.57
Respondeat superior liability should apply to drones. Respondeat
superior encompasses the master’s negligent acts, even if the master
did not command the drone to perform those tasks and could not
foresee those acts in any specific way.

Inc. 133 So. 3d 325 (Miss. 2013)).
50
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (1) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
51
Instructions to Jury No. 5-9, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 12,
2017); Verdict Form, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 13, 2017)
(finding the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment); SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 12A.06.050
(2018).
52
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v.
Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594 (2009)).
53
RESTATEMENT SECOND AGENCY § 229, ILL. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1959).
54
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557 (Tenn. 2005)).
55
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1) (2006)).
56
Instructions to Jury No. 5-9, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 12,
2017); Verdict Form, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 13, 2017)
(finding the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment); SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 12A.06.050
(2018).
57
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing e.g., MV Transp. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324 (Ky.
2014)).
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1. Respondeat Superior Liability
In examining the efficacy of respondeat superior for drones, we
find that the master controller or drone operator must be held to a strict
liability standard. The law as a basic premise attempts to hold
individuals accountable for their wrongs, but the involvement of a
drone complicates such attempts because a drone cannot evaluate an
action as a “wrong” on its own. Usually courts defend the imputation
of strict liability if either: (1) an innocent person, either the plaintiff or
the employer, must bear the loss,58 (2) the employer had formal right
of control over the employee’s work,59 or (3) the employer benefits
from the employee’s work.60 The first consideration of accountability
has been applied selectively by courts; however, in a drone case, this
principle could be crucial to determining the rightful bearer of liability
and so should not be overlooked. Through the accountability principle,
courts may determine the proper responsibility of control to fall upon
the likely beneficiary of the activity. The employer is the likely
beneficiary and must therefore bear the liability of the burdens their
actions have caused. Even though control is questionable in most
cases, drones have a direct connection to a master controller or several
masters to receive instructional inputs; therefore, the employee’s tort
and the master controller’s benefit are an insufficient argument.
Employers, or future drone master controllers, are likely to
discourage employees from assuming responsibility for conducted
drone activity so as to avoid their own liability. If an employee takes
responsibility under enterprise liability, and strict liability is applied to
the operation, then businesses may perceive the risk as worthwhile in
balance with the economic benefits that drone operations bring to the
company.61 However, if strict liability were imposed upon businesses,
a reasonable business model would necessitate more careful
consideration of safety precautions. On the other hand, a business can
subsidize enterprise liability by raising or lowering dividends for use
as insurance for losses caused by injury. 62 If a business were to
implement such subsidization, that policy would result in a spread of
losses to benefit those involved in the business’s activities. 63 The
58

Id. (citing South Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171 (S.C. Ct. App.
1986)).
59
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 7.07(2) (AM. L. INST. 2006)).
60
Id. (citing Mary M. v, City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202 (1991)).
61
Id. (citing Alan Q. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984)).
62
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The
Revitalization of Harardous Acitivity of Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 257 (1987).
63
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.2 (citing George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEG. STUD.

2018]

DRONES: PROPOSED STANDARDS

75

application of strict liability to businesses ensures that no one
individual has to bear the whole loss resulting from their injury.64 As
a result, the consumer of the business’s product may pay a higher
compensation cost to the injured employee.65
Drone manufacturers and suppliers may try to argue that they
should escape liability in certain circumstances, based on various legal
standards of liability for the actions of an employee whose use of a
drone caused personal injury. Courts have found that it is unfair and
inappropriate to hold manufacturers and suppliers liable for the actions
of an employee who disregarded their instructions, failed to behave
according to their training, or who suffered from an undisclosed
emotional defect.66 Arguments that manufacturers and suppliers of a
drone should not be held liable because an injury resulted from the
drone disobeying its commands are inappropriate because the real issue
in determining liability should focus on identifying the commands
given to the drone. Once the injury-relevant command has been
identified, strict liability applies. Various courts have found the
application of the enterprise liability doctrine to respondeat superior
liability to be rational. 67 Based on courts' consideration, it would be
logical for a court to apply this doctrine to drone liability whenever a
master controller as an employer is involved.
2. Unmasking the Apparent Agent
Apparent agency 68 becomes a complex tort law issue when a
master controller or master obtains a leased drone and creates an
illusion that the drone is acting on behalf of their business as their
servant or slave.69 For example, if an employee of Company X deals
with the drone and is led to believe that the drone is owned by the
company for which they work, then under apparent agency, the
employee who is interacting with the drone should be entitled to hold
their employer vicariously liable if they suffer injury from that drone.70
This illusion created by the employer leaves the injured employee open
461, 447–83 (1985)).
64
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The
Revitalization of Hazardous Activity of Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 257 (1987).
65
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.2 (citing Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972)).
66
See Williams v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 1999).
67
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.2 (citing e.g., Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, (2003)).
68
Apparent Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
69
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
70
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03
(2006)).
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to liability for the drone.71 If the drone is acting within its scope of
duty, then the injured employee should be able to hold the employer
vicariously responsible. In addition, the employer should also be held
responsible for the drone which is acting on its behalf. If the employer
fails to properly identify the drone, the employee can reasonably
believe that the drone is acting under the rightful scope of employment
and is thus appearing as the drone of the employer.72
Let us visualize the following scenario: a person’s home requires
bug extermination. The exterminator comes to the individual’s house
with a drone. The drone wears a decal on its body that claims the drone
is from the exterminating company, Company T. The employee from
Company T uses the drone to gas the house. However, as the drone is
releasing the gas inside the house, it knocks over a few antiques and
grazes the inside of the house, leaving gashes in the walls. The
homeowner sues Company T, only to later find out that the drone was
leased from another company, Company E. In this scenario, Company
T is subject to liability, not Company E. Company T has created the
illusion that the drone is theirs and the drone acted as an agent for
Company T; therefore, it can indeed be proper for the homeowner to
think that the drone is an agent of Company T.73
The issue of drone ownership, when decided solely based on
appearance, may create difficulties where an estoppel-asserter 74
plaintiff needs to prove the apparent agent is related to the defendant.
75
On the matter of recovery for an estoppel-asserter upon whom harm
has been inflicted, courts have been divided between Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 267 and Restatement (Third) of Torts § 429,
which both require reliance on the plaintiff or recovery without
reliance. 76 Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267, the
estoppel’s representation 77 would likely need to prove that the
employer or master created the illusion of the drone acting as their
servant or slave. On the other hand, Restatement (Third) of Torts § 429
only requires the plaintiff to have accepted that those services were
handled by the defendant. In both cases, the estoppel-asserter
reasonably believes the services were performed by the defendant.
Therefore, we can conclude that the defendant, who had the drone as
71

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
Id. (citing Wilkins v. Marshalltown Medical & Surgical Ctr., 758 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 2008)).
73
Id. (citing Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Able Moving & Storage Co., 650 So.2d 750 (La. 1995)).
74
Estoppel-Asserter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
75
DOBBS, HAYEN & BUBLICK, The Law of Torts § 433 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp.).
76
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.7 (See Fletcher v. South Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833
(Alaska 2003)).
77
Estoppel by Representation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
72
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their servant or slave, deliberately created and then presented that
illusion. The estoppel by representation cannot recover until that belief
has been proved.78
Apparent authority requires no reliance at all, but only a belief that
the appearance of a drone gives it traceable authority79 to act on behalf
of the defendant’s control and ownership. Agency by estoppel requires
the business to have fostered an intentional or negligent belief that the
drone is their agent or have otherwise failed to correct that
misapprehension. 80 Courts have applied reliance standards based on
the severity of the scenario, ranging from food services to medical
services of the apparent agent.81 Courts determine if a business has
created an illusion of the drone acting as its agent on a case by case
basis. If the drone causes injury or damage, the estoppel-asserter, as a
consumer of the services, will likely have displayed sufficient reliance
upon the business’s name brand.
C. Proposed Master – “Slave” Rule
“Master” and “slave” are common computer terminologies used
by technicians to separate the main device (the master) and the
dependent device (the slave or its slaves). The dilemma of the drone
acting as a slave comes into question when one master, a drone
operator, or a mainframe82, remotely controls a drone as a part of their
task to do work for another. Imagine the following scenario: Company
E leases drones to Company Z and provides Company Z with a drone.
If the drone negligently causes injury to others, the question then arises
whether vicarious liability should fall upon Company E as the drone’s
controlling master, upon Company Z as the special employer, or upon
both.
In a personal employment scenario, courts would use a control
test. 83 Thus, short-term cooperation agreements in personal
employment scenarios cannot be compared to a drone, which functions
as a borrowed employee.84 Assuming that the controlling master, as
the general employer, retains control over the drone, a judge would
likely conclude that the general employer is vicariously liable for the
78

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.7 (citing Baptist Memorial Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969
S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998)).
79
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2006)).
80
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. L. INST. 2006)).
81
Id. (citing See Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4 (2001)).
82
Mainframe, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018).
83
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM.
L. INST. 1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2006)).
84
Borrowed Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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drone’s tort because it acted as a borrowed employee. Alternatively, if
the drone operator, as the special employer, has direct control to
command the drone’s conduct, then the drone operator is the temporary
master and the drone operator has become vicariously liable. If a
mainframe is involved, then it necessarily follows that a hierarchy of
control has been established. Under this hierarchy, the drone operator
has now become the temporary master and ultimate control of the drone
resides with the drone’s master controller rather than with the drone’s
temporary master. Because the controlling master was not controlling
the drone in this scenario, and the last instance of control over the drone
was exercised by the drone operator, the controlling master is unlikely
to be held liable under the respondeat superior doctrine.
Although the drone operator may have control over multiple
drones, the master controller will likely retain control over some
command inputs of the drone; the relevant principle states that liability
for an act follows control, wherever control lies. Furthermore, some
judges conclude that the true definition of control lies in the given tasks
being performed (this is defined as the properties, purpose, and the
tasks undertaken to finish the work).85 The idea of control does not
correlate perfectly to liability. Under the master-slave rule, the idea of
control does not necessarily equate to liability. However, judges may
use details of the controlled technical actions in imputing control, based
on which party provided equipment to the master controller or to the
drone operator. Furthermore, the master controller may retain some
control or interact with the drone at the same time as the drone operator
can have control over some performed tasks, so control can be
undeterminable in many tort cases. In order to apply the notion of
control to cases, courts ultimately evaluate the control elements of a
task based on appropriate or fair outcomes, none of which are directly
related to control or to the technical aspects of the circumstances. The
judge is left to pass judgment on the issue of slave ownership, in spite
of the judge’s lack of technical knowledge. This can easily lead to
conflicting technical conclusions or even to a judicial disaster.
The appropriate standard for assessing the liability of designers,
manufacturers, sellers, lessors, and operators of “drones that have
caused injuries to others” is provided by strict liability. The basic
principle of negligence law is that the defendant can escape liability as
long as they had exercised “due care” in the activity alleged to have
injured the plaintiff. “Due care” means that the defendant has acted
85

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.8 (citing New York Cent. R. Co. v. Northern Indiana Public
Service Co., 140 Ind. App. 79, 221 N.E.2d 442 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
227, cmt. a (1959)).
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reasonably, 86 in light of existing know-how and the capabilities of
existing technology.87 Therefore, the negligence standard operates as
a rule of liability based on industry standards, which are in turn based
on the best practices of skilled practitioners. For example, courts have
looked to negligence when assessing liability for a remotely-controlled
surgery that results in serious harm. If the surgeon in question has used
the best available techniques suitable for the type of operation, then it
would be unfair and unproductive to impose liability on them, as they
will have exercised “due care”. On the other hand, where a surgeon has
performed their task without exercising “due care”, courts have felt that
the surgeon should bear liability for the patient’s injury.88
Currently, the only alternative to negligence doctrine has been the
doctrine of strict liability. This principle recognizes that some kinds of
activity and technology are inherently dangerous and cannot be
operated safely. In these circumstances, courts and legislators have
found some product-related injuries to be worthy of compensation by
the designer, manufacturer, seller, lessor, or operator, even if these
individuals had made the products as safe as possible. This approach
gives the appropriate incentive to those who are in the best position to
insure against liability or to seek ways to make the product safer. For
example, the absolute liability standard has been used to determine an
owner’s liability in instances in which the owner’s dangerous animals
have escaped their care.89 It has also governed the proper storage or
operation of explosives, and has helped inform guidelines for the
prescription of new medicines that cause serious harm. In each
example, the application of strict liability provides strong protection in
the form of the above-described incentive.
In instances of uncertainty or disputed outcomes involving
control, it seems rationally apparent that there are few judges who
would find both the master controller and the drone operator as being
equally liable. By holding both employers equally liable as master
controllers, courts would be biased towards the merits of the disputed
dilemma. This is justified because the operator might not have had
complete control over the drone’s actions, if the operator’s commands
were overridden by a service provider or by the device’s programming.
For example, imagine another scenario in which a drone belonging to
86

See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 10.8.
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 9:22800.59; Neb. Rev. Stat.
§25-21, 182).
88
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.8 (citing e.g., Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.
2009); Starcher v. Byrne, 687 S.2d 737 (Miss. 1997); Harris v. Miller, 438 S.E.2d 731 (N.C.
1994)).
89
See Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Ctr., Inc., 685 N.E.2d 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
87
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Company E is leased out to Company Z to dig a trench. At Company
E’s direction, the drone digs the trench to a dangerous depth. The
trench collapses and a Company Z employee, who was hired to lay
fiber optic lines for the trench, is injured and sues. From the injured
person’s point of view, the employee can maximize the compensation
if: (1) the person can claim workers’ compensation from their
employer, Company Z, and (2) if the person can sue Company E for
tort damages. If both Company Z and Company E are found to be
masters of the drone which excavated the ditch, the injured person
should be able to assert both of the claims. However, Company Z
might find this solution less-than-attractive because Company E may
claim that damages occurred to its drone while it had been excavating
the trench for Company Z. If both Company E and Company Z are
masters, then Company Z will incur worker’s compensation benefits
and Company E will incur the cost of damages to their drone.
Therefore, Company Z would be liable in tort under the worker’s
compensation rule. In addition, this would be an exclusive remedy for
covering the injuries of both employee and drone. If Company E is
found negligent, the effect of treating both employer and drone as
masters in this setting is that Company E should not be immune for the
drone in tort.
Let us next imagine a medical malpractice scenario—where a
drone leased or owned by a hospital assists an independent surgeon in
an operation and negligently harms the patient. Judges would conclude,
based on such facts, that the skilled surgeon, or drone operator, or
mainframe as the master controller, is the captain-of-the ship 90 and
temporarily had the right to control the drone’s work. Under the
captain-of-the-ship doctrine, the surgeon would be liable for the actions
of assistants who are under the surgeon’s control but who are
employees of the hospital, and not the surgeon. As such, the surgeon
should be held liable for the negligence of the assisting drones. The
hospital would not be liable at all, because its drone has become the
surgeon’s borrowed employee (i.e., the surgeon’s slave).
Without considering technical facts, the captain-of-the ship
doctrine attributes the status of master controller to the surgeon as a
matter of tort law. The situation provides a stricter standard than that
of the borrowed employee doctrine. Under the borrowed employee
doctrine, the status of the surgeon as potential master controller poses
questions of facts to be determined on a case-by-case basis, paying
Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, “In medical-malpractice law, the doctrine imposing liability on
a surgeon for the actions of assistants who are under the surgeon’s control but who are employees
of the hospital, not the surgeon.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
90
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particular attention to manufacturing defects. In the past, judges have
rejected the doctrine and held the surgeon liable, but they have also left
room for ordinary applications of the rule: if the surgeon has control of
the drone in the operating room, then the surgeon is vicariously liable.
If future judges find a surgeon liable for the actions of a drone, the tort
would fall under the category of a non-delegable duty.91 The doctrine
of non-delegable duty examines whether the decision was based upon
special duties 92 undertaken by those who care for helpless persons
rather than upon control. Accordingly, the courts might try to apply
non-delegable duty to the surgeon, but this cannot legally be done
under the doctrine of strict liability. If future judges apply nondelegable duties as a matter of policy, then the law would be cleared of
such captain-of-the-ship terminology.
The following scenario provides a sound demonstration of the
suitable application of strict liability to drone-related cases in which
captain-of-the-ship terminology plays a complicating role. Previously,
hospitals had the protection of charitable immunities, under which
hospitals could not be held liable or sued for their employees’
negligence, which practice signaled that non-delegable duties that were
seen as uncompelling.93 These past hospital immunities have strongly
concluded these matters in the form of damage caps.94 In addition,
medical doctors and hospitals are in a position to contract for indemnity
of the surgeon in such cases; as such, a non-delegable duty is not
without some purpose to the plaintiff where it is recognized as such or
imposed under the captain-of-the-ship doctrine.95
II.
DRONE DEFECTS UNDER PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. Proposed Drone Product Liability
At the intersection between drone technology and product
liability, there are four main theories: (1) strict liability in product
defects, (2) breach of warranty, 96 (3) misrepresentation, 97 and (4)
Nondelegable Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Special Duties Doctrine, “The rule that a government entity (such as a state municipality) can
be held liable for an individual plaintiff’s injury when the entity owed a duty to the plaintiff but
not to the general public. This is an exception to the public-duty doctrine. The special-duty
doctrine applies only when the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the governmental entity’s
assumption of the duty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
93
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.8 (citing e.g., Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.
2009); Starcher v. Byrne, 687 S.2d 737 (Miss. 1997); Harris v. Miller, 438 S.E.2d 731 (N.C.
1994)).
94
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 23.3 (citing Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 627
N.W.2d 484 (Wis.2001)).
95
Id.
96
Breach of Warranty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
97
Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
91
92
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negligence. 98 With regard to the application of the strict liability
standard to drones, judges should observe the theories of
misrepresentation and negligence on the part of drone operators, drone
manufacturers, and drone distributors. It seems most suitable that strict
liability should be applied to drones due to the frequency of daily
interactions between humans and artificial intelligence.
The Restatement of Product Liability offers some insight on the
issue of product liability as applied to drone technology. Specifically,
the Restatement 99 provides a test for determining strict liability for
defective products. Under Section 402A, manufacturers and
distributors are not categorically liable for all harm caused by their
defective products. The plaintiff must prove under litigation that: (a)
the defendant was in the business of selling products, (b) he sold or
otherwise supplied the product in question, (c) the product was
expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change, (d)
the product was defective when it left the defendant’s hands, and (e)
the product’s defect was a factual cause of physical harm to the plaintiff
and (f) a proximate cause as well.100
Because manufacturers and distributors are held strictly liable for
defective products, drone manufacturers and distributors may alleviate
the pressures of this liability by spreading their losses across their
business through insurance and by increasing prices. 101 If the
manufacturer is aware that a certain quality standard exists and he or
she ignores this standard or otherwise breaks it, then they are liable in
the court’s eyes. However, this strategy of imposing strict liability
tends to raise costs for the consumer, due to the manufacturer or
distributor anticipating lawsuits resulting from potential injury. 102
Therefore, those drone manufacturers or distributors enter the market
with cheaper materials which people perceive as being safer. This
position is perceived as weighing risks and utilities as the “cheapest
cost avoider.” 103 Generally, drone operators, drone designers, and
drone manufacturers would prefer contracts to escape liability for a
drone. In alignment with the fairness rationale, consumers of drone
98

David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 2.1 (2d ed. 2008).
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.1 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998)).
100
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
101
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
102
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A(1), (2)(b) & (c) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
103
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.2 (citing Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972) (“An arbitrary initial bearer of
accident costs would (in the absence of transaction and information costs find it most worthwhile
to ‘bribe’ in order to obtain that modification of behavior which would lessen accident costs
most.”)).
99
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technology are likely to rely heavily on the manufacturer’s
representation of their non-hazardous and non-high-risk drone
technology and will thus be under the impression that the
manufacturer’s product is safe to use.104
Taken altogether, while various theories of liability currently exist
for drones, the Restatement’s defective liability and 402A principles
make it clear as to which liabilities are likely worth consideration.
Specifically, the Restatement deciphers strict liability by highlighting
manufacturing defects as well as negligence or other similar tests for
design and warning defects.105 Within the last several decades, courts
have followed the comments of the older Second Restatement of Torts
§ 402A without referencing the newer Restatements for strict liability
approaches.106 However, the Third Restatement better addresses issues
in determining product liability outside of strict liability and
negligence. 107 The Third Restatement adds that the risk of harm to
operators through defects must be foreseeable by the design and
warnings. 108 Most courts apply strict liability to cases involving
manufacturing defects, yet leave negligence principles to design and
warnings claims. 109 Let us imagine that a drone stops functioning
according to its pre-programmed purposes or suffers some sort of
debilitating internal damage. The plaintiff has experienced economic
loss in accordance with the Restatement definition; however, no
physical harm has been inflicted on a person or on another piece of
property.110 The only harm was on the drone itself. In this scenario, the
only recourse a plaintiff could claim is a breach of warranty or
contract.111 However, the plaintiff will have no claim on a defective
drone if the statute of limitations has expired under contract or if the
contract excludes or limits the liability of the drone,112 thereby enabling
104

See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.2 (citing William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1123 (1960)).
105
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
106
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.2 (citing Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 628
N.W.2d 833 (Wis. 2001)). A hydraulic jack handle broke, and plaintiff sued the manufacture,
distributor, and seller after they were injured. There can be little room for courts to make changes
themselves for there are a few states statues that embed the Restatement Second Torts § 402A
language).
107
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(1) (AM. L. INST. 1998).
108
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY §§ 1, 2(b) & (c) (AM. L. INST. 1998).
109
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965); See DOBBS ET AL., supra
note 25, § 33.8.
110
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 7 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
111
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248
(1995)).
112
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.4 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9 (1965)).
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the economic loss rule.113 Note that physical harm or injury to a person
under the economic loss rule does not bar that person from tort recovery
for economic losses.114
The same principle applies if a defective drone causes damage
under the other-property rule.115 If a defective drone explodes by itself,
the economic loss rule would govern the claim and the owner would be
required to sue based on warranty.116 However, if the defective drone
exploded adjacent to a building, then the building’s owner could claim
damages to the building, because the building falls under the otherproperty rule – which states that a tort recovery is unavailable if the
only damage caused by a product defect is to the product itself. 117
Additionally, if a virtual bot, which is considered a drone under the
proposed definition, were to physically or electronically destroy
computer-encrypted data through malicious or defective virtualized
commands, this computer data would not be considered by the courts
to be intangible property and the economic loss rule would also apply
to the owner of the computer-encrypted data118. Therefore, the drone’s
master controller or designer would be held strictly liable for physical
damages or harm to the computer-encrypted data.119 A similar strict
liability standard can be applied to cases in which an algorithm-ascomputer-program is involved. According to the current law, drones
that are algorithm-based cannot be considered tangible. Consequently,
if a drone were to contain an algorithmic-based intelligence and the
algorithm ceases to function as a virtual bot, then one could not sue for
economic loss because the drone could not be considered tangible
property.120
Economic-Loss Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2000).
115
Other-Property Rule, “The principle that a tort recovery is unavailable if the only damage
caused by a product defect is to the product itself.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014);
See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. e (1998)).
116
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248
(1995)).
117
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.3 (citing e.g., A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 634 A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994).
118
Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 2003) (“As stored on
a hard drive, data consists of the arrangement “of hundreds of thousands of atoms” of “cobalt,
iron, and other magnetic materials” in a perceivable and unique pattern. The data consists of small
electromagnets in certain alignments. Once data is stored in a cell of a hard drive, that cell is
physically different from a cell without data, and the physical differences between the two cells
can be detected through the use of certain tools. Data stored on a hard drive is visible with the use
of a microscope.”).
119
Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 1:10-cv-01124-JMS-DML, 2011 WL
4550155 (S.D. Ind. 2011)).
120
Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
113
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B. Proposed Manufacturing and Design Defects Liability
Consumers should not only rely on overly-simplistic methods to
determine a breach in warranty or a violation of strict liability.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A has long been the foundation of
the consumer-contemplation test — a method of imposing product
liability on a manufacturer if the evidence shows that a product’s
danger is greater than that which a reasonable consumer expects.121
Under this test, a drone would likely be found to be defective if it placed
the seller into an unreasonably dangerous condition that would not be
obvious to the sophisticated user.122 Examples of such an unreasonably
dangerous condition would include a drone that was supposed to be
weatherproof, but had exposed wires or a drone programmed with the
wrong set of protocols and performed a task not originally intended by
the drone’s designer. However, the customer-contemplation test could
help many courts to determine if a manufacturer’s product
representation appears to be worth the consumers’ time when
entertaining a purchase.123 When a plaintiff discovers hidden product
flaws, the consumer-contemplation test would favor the plaintiff under
the strict liability standard.124 For instance, if a consumer wanted to
buy a flying drone but instead found that the flying drone came with a
sharp metal shard molded into the plastic of the flyer’s body, each party
to this case would likely recognize that molded plastic components
should not contain sharp metal shards. Therefore, even if the
manufacturer did not discover this inconsistency, both parties would
likely recognize that liability would fall upon the manufacturer.125
Courts have often used a risk-utility test in place of the consumercontemplation test to determine a breach in warranty126 or violation of
strict tort liability theories.127 Some courts have given the plaintiff the
choice of using the risk-utility test to help in determining consumer
expectations when the consumer-contemplation test itself does not
computer data, software and systems were not “tangible” property, under policy provisions
covering liability for property damage).
121
Consumer-Contemplation Test, “A method of imposing product liability on a manufacturer if
the evidence shows that a product’s danger is greater than that which a reasonable consumer
would expect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
122
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1965)).
123
Id. (citing Marshall S. Shapo, The Law of Products Liability § 1.02 and passim (4d ed. 2002)).
124
Id. (citing Cf. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BURBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 462 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp.)).
125
See id.
126
Id. (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 663 N.E.2d 730639730 (N.Y. 1995)).
127
Id. (citing Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997)).
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prove the product’s defect.128 A plaintiff who brings a suit against a
manufacturer for manufacturing defects does not need to prove that the
manufacturer, the designer, or the distributor was negligent.129 Thus,
if a plaintiff was hurt by a defective drone, he or she need only show
(1) that the drone was defective at the time when the drone left the
defendant’s possession, (2) that it was expected that the drone reached
the consumer without change, and (3) the consumer received the drone
under the belief that the device would not have likely caused them
harm. The plaintiff can prove that the defect has caused the product to
differ from its intended design.130 A plaintiff can also prove that a
defect exists by showing that the drone malfunctioned or that the
product was improperly made. However, the mere existence of a defect
does not suffice to establish liability where a deviation from the norm
has not resulted in any product malfunction.131
Under the doctrine of strict liability, if a plaintiff provides direct
evidence that his or her drone is defective, then the courts may resort
to the use of circumstantial evidence. 132 No standard rule of law
currently exists for providing evidence applicable to drone defects in
cases against all manufacturers, designers, or distributor of drones.
Each case of malfunctioning drones has focused on the relevant
individual defect, specifically upon either the defect’s apparentness or
the lack thereof. 133 Courts have largely agreed that if a drone is
compliant with industry standards, it is unlikely to be negatively
affected by its environment and should not display any signs of
defects.134
This assumption, regarding drone compliance with industry
standards, extends to the causation of harm principle. Consider a
situation in which a drone not only exploded but the explosion also
caused the plaintiff to lose an eye.135 It would be more appropriate for
the courts to apply the consumer-contemplation test to cases involving

128

See id. (citing DeLaney v. Deere and Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000)).
Id.
130
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998));
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 25, § 33.7 (citing Casey v. Toyota Motor Engineering & Mfg. North
America, Inc. 770 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2014)).
131
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.7 (citing Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equipment, Inc.
737 N.W.2d 397 (S.D. 2007)).
132
Circumstantial Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
133
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.7 (citing Christopher H. Hall, Annotation, Strict Products
Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R. 4th
356 (1989)).
134
See id. (citing Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2002)).
135
Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 80 S.E.2d 253 (1954).
129
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manufacturing defects rather than upon design defect scenarios. 136
Many difficulties arise from applying the consumer-contemplation test
to design defect cases.137 In a scientific or technical case, for example,
the consumer-contemplation test might be too vague.138 Furthermore,
the consumer-contemplation test might prove challenging to the
understanding and abilities of jurors who have no experience with a
new type of drone. The new drone’s defects might be apparent to a
discerning judge, but if evidence exists which indicates that consumers
could not anticipate the severity of harm that could result from these
defects, a pronouncement of liability would likely follow. The
consumer-contemplation test could also create bias within a jury based
on a drone’s appearance. For example, if a drone looks harmless or if
a drone looks dangerously menacing in spite of its safety features.
Without a demonstration of a drone’s capabilities (likely conducted by
one or more technical witnesses), a jury would not know if the drone
in question could cause harm. While courts sometimes perceive the
average consumer’s ignorance of the existence of a potentially safer
design as a good reason for denying liability, such reasoning is not
rightfully applicable to matters of drone liability.139 When determining
if a defect in a drone actually existed, the obvious dangers of a design
defect is a primary factor. Therefore, the consumer-contemplation test
is almost always applied in such cases.140
Courts could use many tests when contemplating the attribution
or exclusion of liability to a dangerous drone. For example, courts have
applied the risk-utility test to design defects, especially when the
plaintiff alleges the existence of a design defect rather than a
manufacturing flaw.141 To prove that a design is defective, a court may
also include the risk-utility test as one part of a two-part test (with the
consumer-contemplation test forming the second part) or as only one
of a series of tests which the product needs to fail in order to qualify as
defective.142 These tests have been integrated into statutes143 and into
the Restatement (Third) of Torts for Product Liability. 144 However,
most courts have used the risk-utility test because it is simple to apply;
136

See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6
138
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing e.g., Morson v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App.4th
755 (2001)).
139
Id. (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997)).
140
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6
141
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.9 (citing Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996)).
142
Id. (citing Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 1999)).
143
Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (b)).
144
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmts. a & f (AM. LAW
INST. 1998)).
137
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it easily allows reasonable people to decipher the evidence, and it not
only determines negligence but also the defect’s magnitude. 145 In
administering the risk utility test, courts have looked to seven factors:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of said product, (2) the probability
and magnitude of possible injury, (3) alternative available known
substitutes, (4) the manufacturer’s ability to remove the unsafe
character, (5) the user’s ability to avoid the dangers of the product, (6)
the extent to which the user can be reasonably aware of the danger, and
(7) the ability of the manufacturer to spread the loss. 146 The
Restatement of Products Liability puts the burden of proof on the
plaintiff to show that the manufacturer or designer could have
minimized the dangers of the product by implementing alternative
designs.147
After the court has used the risk-utility test to impute strict liability
for product flaws or manufacturing defects, ordinary negligence 148
liability generally applies.149 While a court might use several rules in
determining a liability case, the negligence liability of the design will
likely remain.150 The unknown manufacturing risks in a design could
mean the difference between an ordinary negligence case or a liability
case for a design flaw.151 Although a few states have integrated one or
more of these rules into their statutes, the higher courts ultimately use
the risk-utility test when determining and applying ordinary negligence
to design defects.152
C. Proposed Defective Warning Liability
As discussed above, if a defect does not cause physical harm but
causes economic harm 153 to a person or property, then courts will
usually dismiss tort litigation pertaining to strict liability, negligence,154
and fraud. 155 Accordingly, a drone manufacturer, designer, or
distributor must not only provide the risks of a defective design flaw or
145

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 33.6 & 33.8
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing Jon W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Lability
for Products, 44 MISS. L. REV. 825, 837 (1973)).
147
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
148
Ordinary Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
149
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.9
150
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 33.12 & 33.17
151
Id. (citing 2 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BURBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS §
462 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp.)).
152
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.12.
153
Economic-Loss Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
154
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.3 (citing Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Strict Products Liability:
Recovery for Damage to Product Alone, 72 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1989)).
155
Id. (citing Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. 2003)).
146
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defective manufacturing errors, but also reasonable warnings about the
foreseeable risk of harm caused by their products. 156 Drones can be
dangerous, so drone operators should be able to make informed
decisions based on the warnings that can come with a specific drone.
Although dangerous drones are built for specific tasks, the danger can
be minimized by issuing a warning which reduces the magnitude of the
risk or injury to the drone’s master controller or operator by influencing
them to use better safety tactics. A drone operator can act as a drone’s
master controller by identifying and fixing the same sort of problems
as those typically addressed by the master controller, even if they never
purchased the drone themselves. Therefore, courts expect a warning to
the operator to avoid finding strict liability.157
However, not all warnings may stimulate better safety practices.
Warning signs posted in a drone’s area of productivity will likely fail
to protect all employees or passersby given the vagaries of human
nature (exhaustion and lack of attention are especially common
culprits). 158 While drone manufacturers could incorporate an
inexpensive sensor into the drone, the drone could become mistakenly
defective in lieu of this design addition.159 If a drone manufacturer,
distributor, or designer foresees that a safety mechanism is not
practical, then a proper warning can achieve safety for the operator.160
For example, a drone operator or master controller could use gloves to
prevent the electricity from a remote controller from shocking the
drone operator. The drone’s remote controller is not defective in this
manner and the drone operator or master controller was able to shield
themselves with very little effort and without having to sacrifice
practical functionality.
Warning defect claims are considered, alongside ordinary
negligence and design defect cases, under the risk-utility analysis.161
Some courts have held that, because manufacturers can provide
156

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998); Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, Inc., 116 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 1997);
Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).)). The materials supplied with
Taser was described as “less-lethal” weapon in which the Taser been (1) tested on animals with
no findings of having no effect on heart rhythms, and (2) deployed on more than 3000 persons
with no long-term effects. However, the materials supplied with the Taser warned of short-term
injuries from a fall could occur, noting most significant injuries to date had been “cuts, bruises
and abrasions.” Arizona Hindsight Test was applied, due to shock, an officer in training,
compression fracture to their spinal disc.
157
See id. (citing Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 361 Mont. 241, 257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011)).
158
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 33.6 & 33.8.
159
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6.
160
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
161
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) §§ 2(i)(b), (i)(c) & (k) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998); Risk-Utility Analysis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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warnings through media or other engraving techniques on their product
with little cost, even a remote warning about the risks should be found
somewhere on the product. 162 However, others have argued that
verbose warnings overburden the product user and hinder the user’s
knowledge of the product by discouraging a full reading of the
warning.163 In most cases, a court will require a decision to be rendered
in order for the court to determine the accuracy of a warning. 164
Excessive details in a warning label do not mean that the warning has
improved, nor should these details be meant to mislead the user about
the product’s characteristics.165 According to the Third Restatement of
Torts § 2, if a manufacturer has not provided any warning that would
be clearly decipherable by a reasonable person, then the warning is
legally considered to be non-existent and can be assessed as such by a
jury.166
It is difficult to determine the known risks of a product, especially
with new technologies such as drones. A drone may not require a
warning because the attendant risks are commonly known,167 obvious
to the drone operator or to the drone’s owner, or if the warning has been
otherwise conveyed through the chain of distribution.168 This is vastly
different from a design problem.169 If a drone manufacturer produces
two drones, only one of which is safe to use, and makes those dangers
known, the manufacturer does not have to provide separate warnings
for each drone. 170 However, if another drone is cheaply made and
dangerous, the drone manufacturer’s choice does not provide him or
her with immunity because the drone’s danger is apparent and
obviously defective. 171 Only on simple products is there no duty to
provide warnings about obvious dangers.172

162

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing Ross Labs. Div. of Abbott Labs. v. Thies, 725
P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986)).
163
Id. (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
164
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.14 (citing e.g., Koruba v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 935 A.2d
787 (N.J. App. Div. 2007)).
165
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.14 (citing Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d
652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.3 (2d ed. 2008)).
166
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing see, e.g., Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d
749 (Mo. 2011)).
167
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing e.g., In re Prempro Prods Liab. Litig., 514
F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2008); cf. Carrier v. City of Amite, 50 So. 3d 1247 (La. 2010)).
168
See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. 2007)).
169
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13.
170
Id. (citing cf. Carrier v. City of Amite, 50 So. 3d 1247 (La. 2010)).
171
See discussion supra Section II.B. for more details on producing defective drones.
172
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing Mills v. Giant of Md., LLC, 508 F.3d 11 (D.C.
Cir. 2007)).

2018]

DRONES: PROPOSED STANDARDS

91

The central question of strict liability and its proper applicability
to drones concerns whether a jury, comprised of reasonable people, can
decipher obvious dangers. 173 Courts seem to believe that rational
thinkers are able to figure out dangers and that the risks are a matter of
law. 174 This approach will relieve drone manufacturers and drone
designers of their warning obligations. Warnings would serve the
master controller or the drone operator by providing a safer alternative
to the obvious danger.175 For example, manufacturers could provide a
simple engraved statement about the dangers of the drone technology,
accompanied with supplementary material providing an in-depth
explanation of the dangers posed by the drone’s capabilities. Warnings
must clearly communicate their message, in factual content that the
drone operator or master controller can understand. 176 The warning
could be as simple as: “Do not fly drone without propeller guards.” For
a recreational flying drone, the warning would notify the flying drone
operator or master controller that this drone can be dangerous, and this
perception does not negate the need for the warning.177
Individuals dealing with drones should also evaluate whether the
learned-intermediary doctrine can be applied to drone operators and
master controllers. Under the learned-intermediary doctrine, drone
manufacturers have an obligation to warn or must warn appropriate
healthcare professionals who operate medical drones of the substantial
dangers posed by their drone.178 If the surgeon, who is acting as the
master controller of the medical drone, fails to inform the patient about
future risks, the patient can sue the surgeon, but not the drone
manufacturer.179 The learned-intermediary doctrine is a rule of law,
and not a mere balancing act of risks and utility tests applied by a
court. 180 This doctrine is applied to any medical devices, body
implants, and drugs that are customarily issued alongside medical
advice and supervision.181
Furthermore, when considering the learned-intermediary
doctrine, a special danger exists when drone manufacturers or
173

Id. (citing e.g., Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991)).
Id. (citing Sollami v. Eaton, 772 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2002)).
175
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13.
176
See id.
177
Id. (citing Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999)).
178
See Sparks v. Mena, 294 S.W.3d 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 25, §
33.15 (citing e.g.., Simon v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 989 A.2d 356 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
179
See id. (citing Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35 (Ill. 2002).
180
Id. (citing Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging
the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185
(1996)).
181
See id. (citing Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138 (Haw. 1995)).
174
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distributors regularly sell drones to master controllers. 182 This same
danger is also present when drone operators work with a specific drone
that is designed to perform a certain task. 183 Typically, master
controllers or drone operators of drones which are bought for a specific
task will foresee the dangers posed by these drones, while others who
are unfamiliar with those specific drones may not be as
knowledgeable.184 Manufacturers, distributors, and designers should
not omit warnings on these devices altogether based on an assumption
that sophisticated master controllers or drone operators are tech savvy
enough to understand the dangers that the drone could poses to an
unsuspecting passerby or the operator. After all, courts have not
always applied the learned-intermediary rule because their analysis of
each individual case differs.185 In making a warning claim, the plaintiff
must prove that more clear or reasonable warnings were needed to
prevent injury. 186 Thus, no superseding causes can insulate the
defendant from liability for their drone. Yet, this is different than
product defect cases. 187 Before allowing a warning claim to move
forward, courts will first determine if a plaintiff has read and followed
all the warnings supplied with the drone; thus, the plaintiff must prove
that no warning was provided. 188 The same principle applies to
defendants, manufacturers, designers, and distributors of drones if they
failed to warn intermediaries of the inadequacies of a proper warning
and led sophisticated users to rely on their own knowledge or to pass
up on the warning.189 The plaintiff’s inference or presumption about
the warnings and dangers of said drone warnings would signal to a jury
that a factual cause issue is at hand; otherwise, the evidence would
show that the plaintiff did not take the proper precautions described in
the warning supplied by the manufacturer, distributor, or seller of the
drone.190 If the plaintiff failed to read the content-inadequate warning,

182

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.15.
Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, Inc., 116 F.3d 480, ___ (8th Cir. 1997).
184
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.15 (citing See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank and Trust Corp. v. Am.
Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2004)).
185
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.15 (citing Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn.
2001) (distinguishing the learned-intermediary rule and the sophisticated users rule)).
186
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16.
187
See discussion supra Section II.B.; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing e.g. Riley v.
American Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196 (Mont. 1993)).
188
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing East Penn. Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d
1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
189
Id. (citing Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993)). see discussion supra Section
I.C.
190
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Fanham v. Bombardier, Inc., 640 A.2d 47
(Vt. 1997)).
183
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their claim can then be rebutted by the evidence that, their co-workers
or employer could have understood it and therefore would have
adequately advised the plaintiff of the drone’s dangers.191 However, if
a warning is inadequately displayed, then the plaintiff’s burden in this
scenario would be to point out that, if the warning had been adequately
displayed, then it would have caught the plaintiff’s attention, thereby
allowing them to avoid the danger altogether.192 Where courts have
accepted this scenario, they have generally applied the presumption in
the same manner as in cases where no warning existed.193
Drone designers, drone manufacturers, and drone distributors
seeking to counter-argue that the plaintiff did not read the provided
warnings could attempt to prove that the plaintiff would have ignored
the warning’s advice if they had read it.194 In these types of cases, the
plaintiff must prove that even if a warning had been present, it would
not have adequately reminded them about the foreseeable dangers of
the drone’s actions. 195 This chain of arguments would lead the court to
believe that the plaintiff’s actions were in keeping with those of a
reasonable person, so the courts would likely issue a verdict ruling a
warning on the drone would have made no difference at all upon the
plaintiff’s circumstances.196 By the same token, if the proper warning
was ineffective due to the plaintiff’s lack of awareness about the
foreseeable harms, a failure to warn would not therefore be the factual
cause of harm and the plaintiff could not recover.197
Where superseding causes have insulated a defendant from
liability for a failure to warn, the plaintiff’s injury must have been
sustained within the proximate cause that the warning was meant to
avoid. 198 Consider the following scenario: a plaintiff should be
properly warned that operating a drone coated in hazardous chemicals
could cause them to develop cancer via exposure to the prolonged
radiation emitted by these chemicals. Even if the plaintiff’s exposure
to radiation could be limited through the use of protective gear, the
plaintiff should still be informed about the hazards posed by the drone’s
special coating. Failure to warn the plaintiff that the drone’s special
191

DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).
192
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d
861 (Ariz. 1995); Idaho Code § 6-1305).
193
Id. (citing East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. 1990)).
194
Id. (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck ＆ Co. 904 P.2d, 861 (Ariz. 1995)).
195
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16.
196
See id. (citing Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984)).
197
See id. (citing Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 797 A.2d 138 (N.J. 2002)).
198
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 15.16.
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coating would expose the plaintiff to radiation and could result in
liability if the plaintiff developed an injury.199 Similarly, if the plaintiff
broke her leg while working with the drone and kept their job in a
machine-related accident, then the master controller would not be
liable for failure to warn.200 Factual cause for failure to warn would be
applicable in that scenario, though this assumes that the plaintiff would
have taken the necessary precautions or found an alternative way to
work with the drone.201 The drone operator’s physical injury, suffered
at the drone’s hands, is not within the risk that the warning on the drone
was designed to avoid. Although the drone operator was not notified
about the drone’s special coating, courts are likely to hold that there
should be adequate warnings for additional foreseeable causes.202
III.

SCALING DOWN DRONE LIABILITY

A. Proposed Reduction of Strict Liability
Strict liability could be allocable in certain drone tort cases;
however, this is not a constant rule. The Second Restatement gives
courts guidelines for determining uncertainty if a claim is considered
abnormally dangerous.203 However, a common consensus on the best
known practices of drone operation does not currently exist; as a result,
it is unknown whether strict liability does in fact minimize risks. Drone
operators, masters, or master controllers who perform tasks with the
best known practices of proper technical operation, or who operate
drones in an environment deemed safer, could reduce high-risk
activities to reduce the possibility of harm and thus minimize strict
liability.204 As such, it may be more beneficial to target those activities
which entail pervasive risks, due to the lack of strict liability, rather
than seek to limit the hazards posed by high-risk activities. Thus,
because of the constantly-evolving nature of technology, the economic
value of drone use may indeed be greater than the value of more

199

See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 797 A.2d 138 (N.J.
2002).
200
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16.
201
Id.
202
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Eagle-Pincher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 604
A.2d 445 (Md. 1992); In re Levaquin Products Liability Litigation, 700 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir.
2012)).
203
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 707 P.2d 2 (Mont.
1985)).
204
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability
Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611
(1998)).
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traditional methods when carrying out high-risk tasks due to the logical
difficulty of eliminating all potential risks.
In the circumstance in which a plaintiff is participating in
abnormally dangerous actions and a third-party intervenes and so
causes the plaintiff to suffer an injury, the Third Restatement applies
the ordinary scope-of-risk rule. 205 This standard typically applies in
cases where the dangers lead courts to impose strict liability upon the
third party who triggered the injury.206 At a minimum, whenever the
intervening actor is not guilty of causing injuries, the Second
Restatement requires the perspective that the intervention of others is
an invariable element of the risk inherent in abnormally dangerous
actions.207 Whenever a particular action is less likely to result in injury
given intervention by a third party, any relevant harm or injury should
preferably be pin-pointed by case-by-case inquiries.208
When determining the parameters of strict liability, however,
courts typically prioritize the Second Restatement, which limits strict
liability to such cases as the performance of an abnormally dangerous
action 209 or the harboring of an animal which causes harm to others,210
without giving the flexibility of ordinary contributory negligence as a
defense. 211 In the event that a plaintiff was negligently unable to
foresee the imminent danger, the logical conclusion would be that the
plaintiff was not stopped from pursuing their desired course of action
by their negligence.212 With regard to statutes213 that contribute to the
Second Restatement, previous defendants have successfully claimed
that the plaintiff took the risk upon herself214 or was responsible for
contributory negligence by knowingly and unreasonably exposing
herself to the dangers of injury in a strict liability situation.215
Additionally, under the Third Restatement and the Second
Restatement’s comparative responsibility principle, a plaintiff’s
contributory negligence often provides the justifiable basis for a
205

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
206
Id.
207
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
208
Id. (citing Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 Wash. 2d 1, 17 (1991)).
209
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977)).
210
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 515 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
211
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
212
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 218 Mont. 156 (Mont.
1985)).
213
Id. (citing Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1978)).
214
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
215
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515, 524 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
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decrease in his or her chances of recovery. 216 No division exists
between assumption of risk and comparative fault, which are
independent from contributory negligence, and in turn, dependent upon
the comparable reduction-of-damages rule. 217 Crucially however,
strict liability is invalidated if the plaintiff looks to acquire an
advantage of his own by signing a strict liability contract,218 and also
in accordance with some kind of authority, in cases where the plaintiff
participates in the strict-liability situation. 219 Generally, courts are
unlikely to acknowledge strict liability under a Third Restatement
analysis if the plaintiff could have decreased the associated risk of the
action in question to a rationally acceptable amount by exercising
reasonable care.220 Therefore, even if a plaintiff has caused personal
injury to themselves through their own negligence, the Second and
Third Restatements justify recovery by a plaintiff whose own unique
strict liability action is not initially attached to the defendant’s
negligence.221
B. Known Intervention
In drone-human interactions, courts may understand who or what
had control over the risks of a claim by first ascertaining the hierarchy
of the chain of command over the drone. This understanding would
take into account the particulars of a drone case in which the dangers
are not necessarily produced by the defendant’s decisions and/or
actions.222 Despite the inherent flaws in a rule of law which almost
always absolves negligent plaintiffs, the plaintiff is not negligent when
they rely upon the apparent safety furnished by the actions of the
defendant.223 Stopping by a zoo is never an act of negligence, any more
so than would be a defendant’s operation of a zoo. After all, the
assumption of a dangerous animal’s possible escape is not
automatically present if the zoo is well-maintained. The plaintiff, with

216

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 25 (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
217
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 25, cmt. e. (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
218
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 24(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
219
Id. (citing Pullen v. West, 92 P.3d 584 (Kan. 2004)).
220
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 20, cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
221
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515, cmt. b 524, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1977)).
222
See id.
223
See id. (citing William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1705 (1992)).

2018]

DRONES: PROPOSED STANDARDS

97

knowledge of a potential but unlikely danger and who refuses to
relocate or re-orient their property or organization, is not absolutely
responsible in the event that an escape does occur.224 Regardless of
whether the plaintiff is properly permitted to be in their present
location, they do not become responsible by remaining there.225 In fact,
the defendant might potentially have a duty to protect the plaintiff from
their own negligence, in which scenario the plaintiff’s negligence is
without defense.226
Many rationales for industry standards exist in the absence of
applicable government tests. 227 However, the courts could instead
adjust the analysis to inquire whether the danger posed by the
defendant’s activity arose under unique and unlikely circumstances.
Likewise, the courts could also attempt to determine whether the
danger was the product of an interaction with a plaintiff who possessed
a selection of control over these risks.228 To a certain extent, the courts
should limit these characterization conditions. Hence, a defendant
whom the plaintiff failed to stress the comparable risks would be a good
one-way risk candidate for strict liability.
Where a plaintiff proves that a design characteristic triggers
injuries, courts in a limited number of states have shifted the burden of
justifying the design of a product to the defendant.229 In Baker v. Lull
Engineering Co., the plaintiff was operating a heavily-loaded high-lift
industrial-loader and ended up being injured by falling lumber. 230
Upon examination, two of the loader’s design characteristics appeared
to be defective.231 The court ruled that the plaintiff would be able to
recover if the product qualified as defective under the standards of
either the consumer expectations or the risk-utility tests.232 The riskutility test offered an additional advantage: if the plaintiff could prove
that the product’s design characteristics caused his injury, then the
defendant would be responsible for providing adequate justification for
the design under the risk-utility approach.233 The Baker court required
the defendant to prove that the design of their product could not have
224

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515(2), 524(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340 (1914)).
226
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 16.2, 16.6.
227
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1-63).
228
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992)).
229
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.12 (citing Baker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413 (1978)).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. (citing Pannu v. Land Rover North AmericaN. Am., Inc., 191 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2011)).
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been altered to increase its safety at a reasonable cost. 234 No such
burden of proof was placed upon the plaintiff. Strict liability and
negligence 235 require differing burdens of proof in cases where the
courts use both the risk-utility test and the burden-shifting rule.236 Most
courts to consider negligence have rejected this burden-shifting rule237
in accordance with the Third Tort of Product Restatement.238
A statutory adoption of the negligence standard would most likely
have a substantive impact. Courts enforce the negligence standard by
holding manufacturers liable for the known avoidable risks of a design
defect.239 But a statute could limit a manufacturer’s negligence if their
product met the state-of-the-art industry standard.240 Industry standards
have been held as tests; however, the courts do not adopt industry
standards as their own tests. Thus, some statutes foreclose liability for
scientifically unknown risks.241
There are two competing statutory approaches to the state-of-theart industry standard.242 One approach provides that the defendant is
not liable for the product’s design and its method of manufacturing at
the time of the state of the art standard.243 The other approach presumes
the product to be non-defective if it conforms to either “generally
recognized and prevailing standards” or to the state of the art
standard.244 There is a disjunction that distinguishes state statutes from
the state-of-the-art industry standards, which exculpates the product if
either is established. 245 Without the benefit of an interpretation or
simple end results, these types of statutes do not necessarily suggest
that the industry’s peculiar unique techniques could diminish the
boundaries of the drone industry’s liability. State-of-the-art statutes
draw challenges regarding the burden of proof from time to time.246

Id. (citing Baker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413 (1978)).
Id. (citing Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727 (2001)).
236
Id. (citing e.g. Ray v. Bic Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996)).
237
Id.
238
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§2(b), cmt. c, cmt. D,
cmt. f (1998)).
239
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683; N.C. GEN STAT. §
99B-1.1, 99B-4 & 99B-6; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)).
240
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683; N.C. GEN STAT. §
99B-1.1, 99B-4 & 99B-6; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)).
241
Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-104).
242
Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683(1)).
243
Id. (citing e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683(1)).
244
Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2)).
245
Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2)).
246
See id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683; Mo. Stat. § 537.764(2); IOWA CODE § 668.12; LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:2800.59; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182).
234
235

2018]

DRONES: PROPOSED STANDARDS

99

Insofar that a statute does not guarantee admissibility of state-of-theart evidence without prescribing a substantive rule, it fails to specify a
technique regarding the burden of proof.247
Manufacturing defects, as distinguished from design and warning
defects, serve as the basis for strict liability.248 This is because when a
product’s risk is unknowable, its current design and warning claims can
be essentially unsuccessful. 249 However, certain state-of-the-art
statutes could potentially reduce the chances of strict liability
allegations for various kinds of product defects. Many statutes
minimize the state-of-the-art defense; however, it would be a
misinterpretation to permit strict liability to play a role in allegations of
manufacturing defects.250 The fact that a product’s design is state-ofthe-art, thus implying that the product could not likely be risk-free,
does not correspondingly imply that the product’s ingenuity is state-ofthe-art as well.251
IV.

DEFINING DRONES

A. Etymology of Drones
There is some confusion about the legal term of drones in the
minds of judges, lawmakers, and society as a whole.252 Therefore, we
will discover the intended meaning of the term and will propose a
uniform definition of the word drone.253 Historically, the term drone254
was first used in relation to honey bees (Apis). 255 Honey bees have
three types of contributors in their society: queens, workers, and
drones.256 The queen bee is perceived to be in complete control over
her hive257 and she is surrounded by servants, or attendants, who feed
her royal jelly. 258 The queen releases pheromones, chemical signals,
while also sending messages through “messenger bees”259 which can
247

Id. (citing Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1994)).
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19.
249
Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63).
250
Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 537.764).
251
Id. (citing Falada v. Trinity Industries Indus., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 2002)).
252
Govan, supra note 1; Alben, supra note 1.
253
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
254
MARK L. WINSTON, THE BIOLOGY OF THE HONEY BEE 39–41 (1987).
255
Id. at 6.
256
THOMAS D. SEELEY, HONEYBEE DEMOCRACY 25 (2010).
257
WINSTON, supra note 254, at 1.
258
Id. at 71.
259
WINSTON, supra note 254, at 147 (citing Thomas D. Seeley, Queen Substance Dispersal by
Messenger Workers in Honeybee Colonies, 5 No. 4 Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 391415 (1979) (Thomas Seely proposed the term “messenger bees” for worker bees that exchange
248
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act to control many of their behaviors. 260 Furthermore, numerous
studies have verified that, although all workers strive for the survival
of their queen, the queen is not all-knowing.261 Workers collectively
perform endless and diverse tasks through self-governance including,
dying from stinging a colony’s competing hive, tending to the brood,
cleaning, and storing honey; 262 they rarely ever mate. 263 Although
biologists now understand that drones are designed to mate, 264
originally drones were thought to simply be mindless honey bees, and
no different than workers, who all followed orders from a centralized
dictatorship: their queen. 265 By the same token, honey bees are a
collection of individuals which function as an integrated whole and are
unmistakably social creatures.266
In fact, honey bee swarms build a unanimous consensus (or, in
rare cases, split) on certain decisions, such as when deciding on a new
location for their hive, selecting richer nectar sources, or debating more
efficient ways to strengthen the swarm.267 There are no representatives
or bees with superior voting weight, including the queen herself.
Eventually, during the debate process (epitomized by the more “noisy”
visual stimulus) 268 the minority loses its motivation and accepts the
majority’s opinion.269 Interestingly, when a swarm makes a decision,
information though antennations, and pheromones that are distributed all over the queen’s body
to transport messages throughout the colony. These worker bees will exchange information with
up to 56 other worker bees)).
260
Id. at 147.
261
SEELEY, supra note 256, at 5.
262
WINSTON, supra note 254, at 3.
263
Id. at 66.
264
WINSTON, supra note 254, at 41 (citing Y. Lensky et al., Pheromonal activity and fine structure
of mandibular glands of honey bee drones (Apis mellifera L.) (Inseta, Hymenoptera, Apidae), 31
J. INSECT PHYSIOL. 265-276 (1985) (Drones have large eyes, large flight muscles, broad wing
spans, and are fed by workers of the colony).
265
Sarah Pleuthner, How Dominant is the Queen Bee?, AMERICAN HONEY BEE PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://honeybeekind.com/how-dominant-is-the-queen-bee/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
266
SEELEY, supra note 256, at 25; Id. at 75 (citing Martin Lindauer, Schwarmbienen auf
Wohnungssuche, 37 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERGLEICHENDE PHYSIOLOGIE, 263-324 (1955) (Ger.)
translated in P. Kirk Visscher, 52 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENTOMOLOGY, 255-275 (2007),
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/toc/ento/52/1) (In the 1950's scientist discovered bees where
social creatures that performed “judicious imitations” to communicate with each other, instead of
mindlessly taking orders from the queen.); see Aimee S. Dunlap et al, Foraging Bumble Bees
Weigh the Reliability of Personal and Social Information, 26 No. 9 CURRENT BIOLOGY at 1195,
1195–1199 (2016); Id. at 228 (citing ROBERT. J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000);
RICHARD. H. THALER et al, NUDGE (2008)).
267
SEELEY, supra note 256, at 118 (citing JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY
DEMOCRACY (1983)).
268
Id. at 200 (citing see Jeffrey D. Shaller, Neural basis of deciding, choosing, and acting, 2
NATURE REVIEW NEUROSCIENCE, 33-42 (2001)).
269
Id. at 137 (citing Martin Lindauer, Schwarmbienen auf Wohnungssuche, 37 ZEITSCHRIFT
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only three to four percent of the bees actually know where to lead the
other honey bees.270 This process allows the bees to avoid the risk of
creating an information cascade by evaluating independently and
coming to a unanimous consensus via the promotion of ideas through
observation and communication.271 Thus, the parallels between honey
bee drones and human-controlled, manufactured drones are both fitting
and readily apparent.272
The term “robot” 273 has numerous definitions. Although most
individuals view robots as machines, robots in fact possess human-like
capabilities, such as sensing their environment and reacting
autonomously. 274 Thus, we can conclude that the proper legal
definition of a robot does not need to conform to popular culture
expectations. Although robots come in virtually infinite shapes, sizes,
and purposes, they do not have to fit the role of a metallic humanoid
which performs tasks for its masters.
In 1935, U.S. Admiral William H. Standley saw a British
demonstration of the Royal Navy’s new remote-control aircraft for
target practice, the DH 82B Queen Bee. Once he returned stateside,
Standley charged Commander Delmer Fahrney with developing
something similar for the Navy. Fahrney adopted the name ‘drone’ to
refer to these aircraft in homage to the Queen Bee. The term fit, as the
drone could only function when controlled by an operator on the
ground or in a “mother” plane.275
FÜR VERGLEICHENDE PHYSIOLOGIE, 263-324 (1955) at 296 (Ger.) translated in P. Kirk
Visscher,52
ANNUAL
REVIEW
OF
ENTOMOLOGY,
255-275
(2007),
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/toc/ento/52/1).
270
Id. at 182 (citing Madeleine Beekman et al, How does an informed minority of scouts guide a
honey bee swarm as it flies to its new home?, 71(1) ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, 161–171 (2006) (author
states honey bees are ignorant who follow the majority opinion)).
271
Id. at 228 (citing ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); RICHARD. H. THALER
ET AL., NUDGE (2008)).
272
CAPTAIN LINWOOD S. HOWETH, USN, HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY 479 (1963) (citing Letter from Commander Aircraft Battle Force to the
Chief of Naval Operations (Apr. 22, 1933); Memorandum from Plans Division Div., Bureau of
Aeronautics (Aug. 19, 1933); Fleet Training Division, Office Div., Off. of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Targets & Rafts Files, (1935–36) (unpublished manuscript); Letter from Adm. W. H.
Standley to Rear Adm. D. S. Fahrney (Mar. 9, 1953)).
273
KAREL ČAPEK, R.U.R. [ROSSUM’S UNIVERSAL ROBOTS] (1921) (The word “robot” was
derived from the Czech word “robota,” which translates into “drudgery” or “forced labor.””).
274
PAUL J. SPRINGER, MILITARY ROBOTS AND DRONES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 1 (2013)
(citing SIDNEY PERKOWITZ, DIGITAL PEOPLE FROM BIONIC HUMANS TO ANDROIDS 4 (2004)).
275
HOWETH, supra note 272, at 479-81 (citing Letter from Commander Aircraft Battle Force to
the Chief of Naval Operations (Apr. 22, 1933); Memorandum from Plans Div., Bureau of
Aeronautics (Aug. 19, 1933); Fleet Training Div., Off. of the Chief of Naval Operations, Targets
& Rafts Files, (1935–36) (unpublished manuscript); Letter from Adm. W. H. Standley to Rear
Adm. D. S. Fahrney (Mar. 9, 1953)).
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A drone is a preprogrammed machine that carries out tasks with
limiting degrees of human interaction. 276 From a third-party
perspective, drones can be perceived as making decisions on their own.
However, a true drone cannot make wholly independent decisions.277
Most drones do not have a fundamental need for learning-algorithms
or over abundant sensory inputs to carry out their tasks. If a drone has
sensory gear, such gear, benefits its master controller as an extension
of itself. 278 A master controller is either a programmer, service
provider, or even a piece of internal programming, all of which have
the ability to override the operator. Paul J. Springer believes that the
concept of autonomy means that a machine must be able to carry out a
task independent of human intervention.279 Therefore, a drone would
fail Springer’s autonomy test.

FIGURE 1. SCALING DRONE AUTONOMY280

276

See SICILIANO, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1111 fig. 44.2; See infra Figure 1.
SICILIANO, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 308, 346.
278
See id. at 718.
279
SPRINGER, supra note 274, at 4.
280
SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1111 (citing THOMAS B. SHERIDAN: TELEROBOTICS,
AUTOMATION, AND HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL (1992) (Figure 1. The Scope of Drone
277
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Unmanned aircrafts are the most recognized limited autonomous
system in aviation. Springer believes that a machine’s reaction timing
and speed is greater than that of a human and so a significant
percentage of UAV accidents are likely due to human error—for
example, the pilot. 281 A master controller has limited sensory input
from the aircraft.282 With human input, an aircraft can choose its own
flight path, estimate conflicting airspace, and select its own vectors for
targeting or following vehicles on land, sea, or air.283 For the layman,
when considering a drone’s capability to perform such actions, their
minds immediately jump to the next logical question: if a drone is able
to choose its flight path or select a targeting vector, then is it not simply
a matter of time before a robot or a drone will decide for itself to take
a human life? In such an instance, who would have granted the drone
the right to make that decision?
In this regard, the presumption that artificial intelligence (“A.I.”)
comes with a degree of freedom of choice raises the question of
whether A.I.s will emulate human thinking.284 However, a machine
must function independently without an operator to be truly
autonomous. To this extent, a “robotic” is known as a hybrid of a drone
and of a robot.285 Robotics have a limited degree of decision-making
abilities and interaction with their environment and are still under the
command and control of a human operator.286
Our current definition of A.I. requires the inability for a human to
tell the difference between another human and the machine.287 Because
A.I. does not suffer from fatigue or boredom, its decision-making
capabilities are more predictable, as they are based on statistics rather
than a response to emotions.288 A.I.s cannot at this time be creative
problem-solvers; however, they can mimic solutions used by their
programmers.289
Autonomy is variation from Siciliano’s Spectrum of Teleoperation Control Modes flow chart. A
drone’s autonomy ascends from left to right (II-V). In (I), demonstrates pure machinery without
any programming; this is not a drone. In (V), the device relies on its own set of pre-programmed
commands or with a Master Controller that has almost non-existent observation/monitoring from
its Master. In (III-V), the dashed lines represent possible intermittent communications.)).
281
SPRINGER, supra note 274, at 2 (citing KEVIN W. WILLIAMS, A SUMMARY OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATA: HUMAN FACTORS IMPLICATIONS (2004)).
282
See SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1540.
283
Id. at 1748.
284
See ALAN M. TURING, COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE, 434 (Oxford University
Press, 59th ed.,1950)
285
SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1789.
286
Id. at 1919.
287
See Turing, supra note 284, at 435.
288
SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 334.
289
SPRINGER, supra note 274, at 3 (citing VINCENT J. VAN JOOLEN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
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Nevertheless, an autonomous device can malfunction, perhaps
due to faulty programming, and go against its operator or master or
cause errors. Springer suggests that autonomous weapons should not
be incorporated into robotics and drones, due to the fact that they are
expendable, unlike humans.290 Drones can perform tasks that are too
dangerous for humans to undertake. As Clarke famously stated, “any
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”291
Clarke believed that, to the minds of a population unfamiliar with the
function or development of a high-technology device, magic is a
perfectly acceptable explanation for the presence and workings of said
device.292
Robots are commonly viewed as physical entities or a race of
some kind that are controlled, pre-programmed, or self-reliant.
However, many people hold the misconception that robots, and so
drones as well, are necessarily metallized machines with a humanoid
appearance. History reveals that the word “robot” was first used in a
play, written by Karl Capek in 1921, called “R.U.R. (Rossum’s
Universal Robots).”293 The play is about mechanical men who were
built to work on factory assembly lines and eventually rebelled against
their human masters.294 These mechanical men obtained their name
from the Czech word for slave. 295 Additionally, in 1928, Alan H.
Reffel, an engineer, coined the stereotypical robot characteristics from
his creation, known as Eric Robot.296 Reffel’s depiction of Eric Robot
started the classic Hollywood horror film portrayal of robots as having
white bulbs painted red for eyes, stiff, motorized leg movements, a
body made out of aluminum, and, lastly, an electronic voice which
appears to be autonomous or otherwise directly under human
control. 297 Altogether, these popular culture depictions have
influenced the common perception of both robots and drones, most
critically in a misleading or even confusing fashion.

AND ROBOTICS ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF 2020?

Carlisle, PA: Army War College (2000)).
Id.
291
Id. at 5 (citing ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LIMITS
OF THE POSSIBLE 21 (revised ed. 1973).)).
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http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/courses/soco/projects/1998-99/robotics/history.html (last
visited Jun. 20, 2017).
294
Id.
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John Reffell, AH Reffell & Eric Robot (1928) – The UK’s First Robot, REFFELL FAMILY
HISTORY, http://www.reffell.org.uk/people/ericrobot.php (last visited June 12, 2017).
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Like drones, robots receive orders and take action based on a
given set of commands from a central location or central processing
unit.298 A robot is actually the physical shell with the appearance of a
mechanical machine. However, a robot cannot be identified as a drone
under the proposed definition if the robot does have an autonomous
machine-learning algorithm.299
B. Proposed Uniform Definition of Drone
State laws have interpreted an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)
or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to be a “drone.”300 However, this
section describes what the nature of a drone should be in tort law.
Drone generally means any algorithm that carries out an action
following a command or commands. This includes commands
programmed in advance and real-time commands.
Drone intelligence is an algorithm which can act in an intelligent
fashion, as said algorithm is based on the intellects of the humans who
constructed the algorithm.301 Therefore, a drone possesses a minimal
artificial intelligence algorithm. Per industry standard, the drone’s
artificial intelligence algorithm can be simplified into two categories:
commanded (controlled)302 and predetermined (list).303 A commanded
(controlled) purpose is known as input from a central location or a
controller.304 A drone’s artificial intelligence relies on a controller, or
master, to give the drone a set of instructions.305 The best example to
illustrate this reality is that of a radio-controlled car: whatever input is
signaled to the car from the joystick, the robotic car will respond every
time to these received signals.
Predetermined artificial intelligence draws from a list of preprogrammed commands.306 The artificial intelligence in question can
have the appearance of predictability, randomness, strategy, or simple
reactiveness to its surrounding environment, all as defined by the
298

SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 284.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
300
HOWETH, supra note 272, at 497 (citing Letter from Commander Aircraft Battle Force to the
Chief of Naval Operations (Apr. 22, 1933); Memorandum from Plans Division Div., Bureau of
Aeronautics (Aug. 19, 1933); Fleet Training Division, Office Div., Off. of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Targets & Rafts Files, (1935–36) (unpublished manuscript); Letter from Adm. W. H.
Standley to Rear Adm. D. S. Fahrney (Mar. 9, 1953)).
301
SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 298.
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Id. at 1085.
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Id.
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Id. at 1110 (citing N. Tesla: Method of and apparatus for controlling mechanism of moving
vessels or vehicles, US Patent 613809 A (1898)).
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programmer. These types of intelligence have been viewed as either
smart or illogical, depending on the outcome when said artificial
intelligence interacts with a human’s judgment.307
Regardless, drones are highly capable of causing serious bodily
harm; therefore, robotic engineers and robotic scientists have proposed
to adhere to Isaac Asimov’s three fundamental Rules of Robotics: 308
1.
A robot may not injure a human being or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2.
A robot must obey the orders given it by human
beings except where such orders would conflict with the
First Law.
3.
A robot must protect its own existence as long as
such protection does not conflict with the First or Second
Laws.309
Legal scholars argue that robots capable of causing serious bodily
injury break the “strict” three laws of robotics developed by Asimov.
310
However, although robotic experts have referred to Asimov’s
science fiction works for their guidelines on robotics, such works detail
concepts and devices that were merely imaginary at the time, but which
are certainly no longer merely speculative.311 As such, Asimov’s rules
for robots (defined as android autonomous artificial intelligence)
should not apply to drone intelligence at all. Artificial intelligence
engineers and scholars should not restrict the subject and rules of
artificial intelligence to concepts found within Asimov’s science
fiction. Courts should instead hold the master operator, master,
designer, or manufacturer strictly liable for the actions of the drone in
question. The confines laid down by Asimov’s works are much too
narrow to do proper justice to the highly complex and still evolving
matter of drone technology.
None of the above described robot laws are applicable to the
current drone technology. Satya Nadella created Satya Nadella’s A.I.
Laws312 and Mark W. Tilden presented Tilden’s “Laws of Robotics.”313
307

See Turing, supra note 284.
E.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, ‘Sophisticated Robots’: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (2015); ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround (1942), reprinted in
I, ROBOT 37 (1977).
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However, these new ideas are neither new nor groundbreaking and fail
to help advance artificial intelligence law as it pertains to the issue of
strict liability. More fittingly, the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research
Council (AHRC) of Great Britain in 2011 published a set of five ethical
“principles for designers, builders and users of robots”:
1. Robots should not be designed solely or primarily to
kill or harm humans.
2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots
are tools designed to achieve human goals.
3. Robots should be designed in ways that assure their
safety and security.
4. Robots are artifacts; they should not be designed to
exploit vulnerable users by evoking an emotional
response or dependency. It should always be possible
to tell a robot from a human.
5. It should always be possible to find out who is legally
responsible for a robot.314
These rough guidelines have been complied by multiple scholars,
engineers, and theorists and have been increasingly fine-tuned, thus
rendering them much more suitable for legal consideration than the
currently relied-upon science fiction works. As mankind searches for
emotional companionship, it will be quite complex to implement
Robotic Law Number Four and the EPSRC and AHRC principles for
designers, builders, and users of robots. These examples of robotic laws
furnish an excellent starting point, but by no means do they comprise a
gold standard of robotic law for legal scholars.315
Currently, drones may or may not pass the Turing test, all without
any relevant restrictions to the proposed drone definition. The Turing
test was designed to observe if a human subject would be able to
evaluate the true identity of the entity with whom they were interacting:
an actual human being or a computer chat bot.316 Its creator initially
suggested that if the machine could convince a human of its own
humanity after five minutes of conversation at least thirty percent of
the time, 317 then the machine could be fairly said to have passed
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Turing’s test. This test measures not the machine’s ability to correctly
answer questions, but instead how closely the machine’s answers
resemble those that an average human would give. 318 Therefore, a
drone could pass the Turing test319 so long as it could convince a human
subject of its human-like decision-making abilities.
In the legal world, the term drone can also be used to identify
humans who smuggle drugs, such as marijuana, in the employ of an
illegal business.320 These human drones follow orders from their drug
lords in an effort to provide an income for themselves and/or their
families.321 As shown, lawmakers and politicians do not use a singular
meaning when they seek to identify a drone.322 As the Seventh Circuit
Judge Easterbrook wrote in one opinion, “[d]rones of the organization-the runners, mules, drivers, and lookouts--have nothing comparable to
offer. They lack the contacts and trust necessary to set up big deals, and
they know little information of value. Whatever tales they have to tell,
their bosses will have related.”323 In this manner, it is clear that the
term drone’s essential definition, regardless of its use or application, is
related to either something or someone who unthinkingly takes
commands.
We also see the legal definition of drone being used imprecisely
at the state level:
Washington State’s definition of a “Drone” holds that the
term “should apply to unmanned aerial vehicles
controlled by a remote operator . . . [such as a]n unmanned
aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct
human intervention from within or on the aircraft”.324 By
contrast, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)
does not define Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (“UAVs”)
as “drones,” holding that “[u]nmanned aircraft means an
aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human
intervention from within or on the aircraft.” 325 As such,
than 70 percent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.”).
318
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the FAA definition is compatible with this Article’s
proposed drone definition.
CONCLUSION
As legislators work to integrate the concept of artificial
intelligence into the law, courts must determine the placement of the
drone master, master controller, or operator in the hierarchy of drone
liability. Drone generally means any algorithm that carries out an
action following a command or commands. This includes commands
programmed in advance and real-time commands. In drone liability
cases where the agent is unclear, courts should rely on scientific
knowledge to determine the actor who is at fault. The drone
manufacturers, distributors, or designers should be held to a strict
liability standard for any defects. This is proven to be the case in
instances of physical harm caused by a drone in which the master
controller, the master, or the operator has been held strictly liable.
Bearing these recommendations, future courts will be significantly
better equipped to evaluate cases of drone liability.

